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## BOOK REVIEWS

NIETZSCHE AND OTHER EXPONENTS OF INDIVIDUALISM. PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1914. Pp. 144.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. H. L. MENCKEN. Luce & Co. 1913. 3d ed. Pp. xiv, 304. \$1.50.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE: AN EXPOSITION AND AN APPRECIATION. GEORGES CHATTERTON-HILL, Ph.D. D. Appleton & Co. Pp. 291.

NIETZSCHE, SEIN LEBEN UND SEINE WERKE. RICHARD M. MEYER. C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. München. Pp. 690.

America has not been altogether fortunate in the introductions it has had to Nietzsche from home talent. Aside from Dr. Grace N. Dolson's early philosophical study, now out of print, and Miss Emily S. Hamblen's *Friedrich Nietzsche and his New Gospel*, which shows rare sympathetic insight, little of value has been written.<sup>1</sup> Lack of knowledge is the main reason; critical talent and literary skill, as in the case of Mr. Paul Elmer More, do not make up for this. Nietzsche has to be studied (contrary to the general impression), and almost no one has thought it worth while to do this.

One might expect better things of the professional philosopher, but Dr. Carus has disappointed us. He has no lack of good will, but his book is the result of hasty and superficial reading; necessary distinctions are not made; the treatment is "plump." Nietzsche is "pure-hearted and noble by nature," but "goody-goody"; his "life might have earned him the name of sissy." *Zarathustra* is spoken of as "the last work of his pen" (!), and is recommended to those who would know him at his best; though it is safe to say that without a previous reading of earlier works it is almost unintelligible. In general, Nietzsche is "a poet, not a philosopher, not even a thinker"; he "must not be taken too seriously . . . he criticised and attacked like the Irishman who hits a head wherever he sees it." Indeed, his philosophy is "a harmless display of words," and wherever he is mentioned by professional philosophers, "it is in

<sup>1</sup> I do not forget occasional single articles in out-of-the-way technical journals by scholars like Professor Bakewell and Professor Thilly, and Dr. C. C. Everett's early discussion in *The New World*. The latter (with all respect be it said) would have been greatly improved had Dr. Everett lived to revise it in the light of Nietzsche's complete *Werke*.

criticism" (strange that philosophers should concern themselves with mere "displays of words"). His best-known German expounders are said to be Rudolph Steiner and Alexander Tille. Dr. Carus appears to be ignorant of the more significant and authoritative works of Professors Riehl, Simmel, Ziegler, Vaihinger, Richter, Dorner, Drews, Joël, and of W. Weigand, J. Zeitler, and E. Eckertz. Of Frenchmen he mentions Professor Lichtenberger (credited to Nancy, though now long in Paris); not Émile Faguet, E. Seillière, C. Andler, nor the Belgian Professor R. Berthelot. We are told that Nietzsche was "too proud to submit to anything, even to truth," too proud "to recognize the duty of inquiry"; he "expressed the most sovereign contempt for science, exhibited a remorseless contempt for everything that comes to us as a product of history." Indeed he scorned "not only law and order, church and state, but also reason, argument, and rule." He did away with "moral maxims," and it is this that "has made him popular." Nietzsche knows nothing of "self-control"; he "made himself the advocate of vice and gloried in it"; among the thoughts of George Moore which Nietzsche might have written is, "I boasted of dissipation." If his doctrines prevailed, "the selfishness of mankind would manifest itself in all its rude bestiality." Sympathy is to him a relic of the ethics of a negation of life; "good and evil" are "distinctions invented for the enslavement of the masses." His "ideal is brutal strength, his overman the tyrant who tramples under foot his fellowmen"; "a ruthless demagogue, a self-made political boss," such is "the overman."

Any one familiar with Nietzsche's writings knows the occasion for all these judgments, and equally that they amount to a caricature of him. Max Stirner is called his "predecessor." He "adopted Stirner's extreme individualism," "stole his thunder," and, if he does not give him credit, "why should he?" since he acknowledges no "rule which he feels obliged to serve." "The fundamental error of them all [Nietzsche, Stirner, and 'other kindred spirits'—I quote here the publishers' announcement, presumably Dr. Carus's own] is an extreme individualism, which regards every single person as an absolutely autonomous sovereign being." But this is just what Nietzsche does not assert and rather denies. His philosophy is directed, he tells us in so many words, not toward an individualistic morality, but toward a *Rangordnung*. A sweeping individualism, as Dr. Carus justly says, tends to anarchy; but anarchy (save in a highly spiritualized sense and with exclusive application to the most spiritual class of men) is what Nietzsche abhors. Indeed it

must be said with great regret that Dr. Carus, instead of correcting and clarifying ordinary public opinion about Nietzsche—and what is the philosopher for but to correct and clarify ordinary opinion?—does little more than reiterate and confirm it. This does not mean that he does not say many wise things here, as in his other books.

The announcement of a new “fully revised” edition, “with much new material,” of Mr. Mencken’s much-read book (originally published in 1908) is a matter of interest. Mr. Mencken is a Baltimore journalist and musical critic of reputation. He wisely recommends reading other books of Nietzsche’s before taking up his *Zarathustra* (mentioning, oddly enough however, but one earlier and several later ones); discreetly says, “Nietzsche’s poetry had better be avoided by all who cannot read it in the original German”; and, apropos of the English edition of the *Works*, remarks that one feels his charm, “*even when one reads him through the English veil*” (the italics are mine). He is not, however, quite accurate in speaking of the English edition as “complete,” the “whole canon” of Nietzsche’s writings. Several volumes of posthumous work are not included, and they are of considerable importance. He treats successively of “Nietzsche the Man,” “Nietzsche the Philosopher,” and “Nietzsche the Prophet”—an admirable arrangement, save that under the last heading little or nothing is said of Nietzsche as prophet, the two chapters being devoted to his “Origins” and his “Critics.” These chapters belong to the revised part of the book. Just what improvements have come with the revision in general I am unable to state, as I have not the original edition with me, but some crudities and partial apprehensions appear to remain. For example, Nietzsche is still represented as asking, “Why should any man bother about moral rules and regulations?” “He should judge a given action solely by its effect upon his own welfare; his own desire or will to live and that of his children after him.” “To put it more simply, Nietzsche offers the gospel of prudent and intelligent selfishness, of absolute and utter individualism.” But for and from the great mass of men Nietzsche desiderates, as a matter of fact, a regard for social morality as something absolutely sacred (an “*unbedingt Heilighaltung der Heerdenmoral*”). Mr. Mencken explains in a footnote (one of the additions, I imagine) that Nietzsche’s “selfishness” is only for the exceptional, superior man (he keeps the “any man” already quoted), and that this is the only kind of human being Nietzsche takes into account, the rest being “unworthy of consideration.” This last is emphatically not true. But even with such a limitation, the view fails to reckon with the fact that the higher man,

as Nietzsche conceives him, may risk or even sacrifice his life on occasion, instead of cleaving to it, and that in such giving and spending of himself his elevation and greatness in part consist.

Mr. Mencken thinks that, according to Nietzsche, the strong sacrifice the weak, putting them, for instance, "in time of war into the fore-front of the fray"; the result being that "the weakest are being constantly weeded out and the strongest are always becoming stronger and stronger"—a fantastical construction both of history and of Nietzsche's thought. "The strong cannot give of their strength to the weak without decreasing their store," it is said; but it is, according to Nietzsche, just because of their strength that they *can* give; it is the weak for whom the law of prudence is so imperative. So Mr. Mencken does not give quite accurately, because he does not himself perceive clearly, Nietzsche's distinction between "good and evil" and "good and bad." He is also more or less confused about the contrast of Apollonian with Dionysian; even speaking of the "apollonian morality of the ancient Jews," and of Roosevelt's "centralization" as "a truly dionysian idea"! He misstates the motives and processes of thought by which Nietzsche was led to believe in "eternal recurrence"; and he gives a very one-sided idea of Nietzsche's attitude to what he calls "the drudge class," "the proletariat." He has little sense of the part which self-control plays in Nietzsche's general ethical philosophy, imagining that it stands to Nietzsche for lack of courage (!), and also of the part which discipline plays in his view of education. Mr. Mencken too has good-will and might almost be called a Nietzschean, but he has not studied his subject thoroughly and patiently enough, and is evidently too much under the influence of his old-time anarchistic and materialistic perspectives, and yields too much to the journalistic instinct for smart writing and piquant statement. And yet he makes certain distinctions admirably and knows his subject much better than Dr. Carus. He points out, for instance, that while Stirner's "plea is for absolute liberty for all men, great and small," Nietzsche is for liberty only in the higher castes. He sees and says that Nietzsche was not a revolutionist or advocate of sudden change. His teaching, he recognizes, is addressed, not to men in the mass, but to the small minority of exceptional men; while at the same time it is not a caste-system (in the ordinary sense) in which he believes, since there is to be in it free movement up and down. He recognizes too that Nietzsche did not wish to abolish Christian morality completely nor propose a "unanimous desertion of the idea of sympathy for the idea of intelligent self-seeking." Further, he

discriminates as to Nietzsche's "romanticism." Altogether we have good hopes for a fourth edition of Mr. Mencken's book.

Dr. Chatterton-Hill's *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* is probably the best large book of all those originally written in English on Nietzsche—leaving then to one side the smaller works of Dr. Dolson and Miss Hamblen and the well-nigh perfect short manual of Mr. Anthony M. Ludovici in the *Philosophies, Ancient and Modern* series, as also a translation of Professor Lichtenberger's fine treatment of the subject. Dr. Chatterton-Hill is a *Privatdocent* in the University of Geneva (Switzerland), and writes as one who has known Nietzsche's spell though he is under it no longer. He at once goes to the bottom of things by characterizing Nietzsche as "always an essentially religious nature." He notes that Nietzsche even regarded Christianity and the moral law as "indispensable in their proper place," and that *Zarathustra* borrowed from the Gospels much of his method. What Nietzsche opposed, he says, is "the monopoly of Christianity"; for however useful it is to the mass of men, it acts like poison on those who are by their nature above the mass—the great, exceptional men who are humanity's final justification. He sees, indeed, that Nietzsche found a place and function for the slave and mediocrity, and quotes, as if to correct Mr. Mencken, Nietzsche's remark that contempt for the toilers is unworthy of the philosopher. And yet above the "gregarious animal, living with and by the herd," is, he knows, "the solitary individual, strong in his solitude," who was the supreme object of Nietzsche's concern. Christianity would practically outlaw him; Nietzsche would again give him room and scope. He also happily corrects Mr. Mencken (I do not mean that the latter is referred to), when he says, in giving Nietzsche's view, "He who is strong and powerful and a lover of life consumes his energy without further thought. He spends out of the overflowing richness of his vitality. He cares not for a long life. . . . Only in the measure that we can afford to live fully, to be extravagant and thriftless with our vital power—only in that measure are we strong and powerful." There are also happy reproductions of Nietzsche's views as to the differing *intellectual* character of the stronger and weaker races, and as to the essentially nihilistic tendency and direction of Schopenhauer's ethics based on *Mitleid* ("pity" is the more correct translation here, not "sympathy," the word which the author mostly uses).

Of criticism Dr. Chatterton-Hill gives us little; perhaps the best is that of Nietzsche's varying conceptions of truth (cf. pp. 175–183). Nietzsche is spoken of as at once a genius and a lover of paradox;

his general influence is, indeed, explained by his style and the force of his expression, but his influence on the world of thinkers is credited to other reasons. Some of the representations of Nietzsche's views are not quite satisfactory; *e.g.*, as to the Apollonian and Dionysian states of mind, though the author comes nearer the mark than Mencken. Again, he says that Nietzsche regarded "the cosmological process in its entirety as an æsthetical manifestation of the universal Will." But this holds only for Nietzsche's first period, and for a portion of that. The maturer Nietzsche knows no "universal Will"; he is pluralistic *au fond*. So his "worship of art as the *raison d'être* and object of life," which the author makes general, holds only of the first period. To mould life *itself* after the ideal, his ideal, becomes the aim of his later, and particularly latest, years. Dr. Chatterton-Hill even says that Nietzsche's message is sufficiently "Neronian to enable us to conclude that Nietzsche must have been an admirer of Nero." But he should read what Nietzsche says of Nero in *Will to Power* (§ 874). He quite misconceives Nietzsche's meaning in speaking of eternal life as wished for, because only in eternity can the plenitude of life's expansion be realized. For good or ill, eternal life is to Nietzsche only a recurrence of the heights and shallows of this life. So he misses the meaning of Nietzsche's glorification of "free death," and he sometimes overstates, *i.e.* states one-sidedly, Nietzsche's hostile attitude to morality—a subject that requires much refinement in handling. When he says, "Morality is necessary to the construction and continued maintenance of the social structure," he in effect only repeats Nietzsche; but for Nietzsche the social mechanism is not an end in itself, and its law is not the only law; and when this is set up as the only law, it becomes tyrannical and has to be fought. Here, as Dr. Chatterton-Hill lets us see, is the ground of Nietzsche's hostility to morality (*i.e.*, taken as something final and absolute)—and to Christianity. Unsocial or even, within limits, anti-social qualities may mark the great man, in Nietzsche's view of the matter; at least, he (the great man) wants to be himself, not one of a crowd, whatever *Bosheit* and hardness that may involve.

Professor Meyer's book has pathetic interest for students of Nietzsche in that it is the last work of his laborious life (he died in October, 1914). The distinguished author of the standard *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* was for many years Professor Extraordinarius in the University of Berlin (only not made Ordinarius, it is said, because of his Jewish ancestry; even as Professor Simmel, to become an Ordinarius, had

to leave Berlin for Strassburg—and Berlin is *not* in Russia). His present book is perhaps the best all-round book on Nietzsche in any language. Philosophical students will still go to Riehl and Vaihinger, and above all Simmel and Richter, and those with biographical interests mainly will go to the *Leben* by Nietzsche's sister and the *Vie* of M. Halévy; but for a view of the total human phenomenon—thought and personality—and especially of its historical and literary setting, nothing thus far compares with Meyer. It is a work to make us sensible of the disparity of our American and English culture. Meyer is a man of letters, but a philologist as well. He has philosophical training also, and deals, however lightly, almost always surely with Nietzsche's various philosophical problems; and he has wide historical knowledge and enormous literary erudition. Perhaps the book is a little over-supplied with the latter.

After several introductory chapters and three which may be called biographical (devoted in turn to Nietzsche's life, his studies and the method of them, and his distinctive personality), Meyer takes up the works chronologically and his book might be described as an illuminating commentary upon them. Of special interest is a preliminary chapter on the *Vorarbeiten*—the philological, philologico-philosophical, philosophico-pedagogical, and pedagogical studies, and also the University lectures, which antedated (or at least were independent of) the first-published book, *The Birth of Tragedy*. In general Meyer is at once sympathetic, penetrating (with the insight that sympathy alone gives) and critical. His relations with Nietzsche's sister, to whom we owe so much (he too), we perceive have not been altogether cordial. He finds her *Leben* no "*unbefangene historische Quelle*," and he deplores her treatment of Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (who attacked the *Birth of Tragedy*). He makes no concealment of the "all-too-human" side of Nietzsche himself; remarks on an uncivil and unlovely letter to Deussen (when the latter did not take solemnly enough his appointment to Basel), on an insulting communication to Paul Rée's brother about Rée, and cannot justify Nietzsche's injurious words to his old friend Rohde, which produced the final rupture between them. Constantly we come on signs of independent judgment. He corrects Nietzsche's interpretation of "science," disagrees with his view of E. von Hartmann, criticises his depreciation of "practical" men, finds him one-sided in his attitude to Christianity and sinking to the level of "ordinary theological polemics" in *The Antichristian* (he justified this as the proper translation of



*Der Antichrist* in a private letter to the present writer—it is also Professor Lichtenberger's); finds a mythological element in the doctrine of "eternal recurrence"; notes his occasional slips and negligences of style, in particular, the too frequent use of italics and the tastelessness of some of the word-combinations in *Zarathustra*. At the same time Meyer thinks that there is more continuity, consistency, and "system" in Nietzsche's views and their development than is commonly recognized. He regards him as a thinker *par excellence*. He has high words of praise too for his poetry—at least some of it. The conditions of a great letter-writer, however, he finds unfulfilled in him. For one thing, he was too exclusively concerned with his central problems (an excellent selection, I may add, from the five published volumes of Nietzsche's *Briefe* has been made by Dr. R. Oehler, Leipzig, 1911).

It is with diffidence that one ventures to differ from so great an authority on points of interpretation, but I question whether "no transition [for humanity] into a higher order," as asserted in *The Dawn of Day*, refers to a possible order of superman or supermen. It is rather the ordinary thought of immortality that is there in mind. So Meyer appears to me to omit something in his account of the psychological origin of the doctrine of "eternal recurrence"—namely, the element of intellectual necessity; I mean the general philosophical or scientific reasons. He overstates the mythical and mystical features of the idea. If "mysticism" simply means a state of transport and exaltation, Nietzsche certainly participated in it at times; but if it means that exaltation *takes the place* of thought and confuses intellectual perception, I question whether Nietzsche had much part in it. He once happily says, "*Wenn Skepsis und Sehnsucht begatten, entsteht die Mystik.*" It perhaps applied to Newman and certainly does to many refined and tender minds of the present day, but hardly to Nietzsche. Equally is Meyer's view questionable, that Nietzsche would rather have an endless movement in a circle than a fixed state on however high a level, hence "eternal recurrence." If I read his mind and soul aright, he would rather have progress *ad infinitum*; but he takes the world's forces and the sum of them, after current "scientific" fashion, as measurable, finite. Hence when a certain point in their development and elaboration is reached, there *can* be no further progress, and, in a world of movement and change, disintegration and recession become inevitable, with, in the course of infinite time, a repetition of the original developmental process. It was not wishes, but the logic of reality (as he saw it) that compelled to "eternal recurrence." But I must not

close without expressing deep respect for this monumental work of Professor Meyer, and for the spirit which animates it.

WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.

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THE JEWS OF TODAY. ARTHUR RUPPIN. With an Introduction by JOSEPH JACOBS. Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 310.

This is a translation of a book which first appeared in 1904, and in a second form in 1911. The author exhibits the dangers which threaten Judaism from the facility with which the Jews have always been assimilated to the environing population and absorbed in it, a process which is going on in our own time with increasing rapidity; he discusses the causes and phases of this assimilation, and the remedy, which, in his opinion, is to be found only in a re-created Jewish nationality, having a Hebrew-speaking Jewish state in Palestine as its centre. Whatever may be thought of this theory, the description of the actual conditions of the Jews in the several European countries and in America and the large body of statistics which Dr. Ruppín has compiled, make the volume instructive reading and useful for reference.

G. F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY. HANS DRIESCH, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. The Macmillan Company. \$1.00.

Is life a mechanism and nothing more? Is it possible to interpret what happens in the living body wholly in terms of physics and chemistry? Can a complete interpretation of Nature be made in terms of bodies moving in space? These are some of the many formulations of the problem of "Vitalism *vs.* Mechanism," and some of those discussed by Professor Driesch in his latest book, *The Problem of Individuality*. As those who are familiar with the earlier works of the same author would expect, the present volume is an attempt to defend the vitalistic thesis. To Driesch, as to philosophically-minded biologists generally, nature and life may be only partially interpreted in terms of mechanism. To demonstrate the truth of vitalism and the inadequacy of the mechanistic hypothesis Driesch in the present volume uses both inductive and deductive methods of reasoning.

The author finds the fundamental problem of vitalism presented by the phenomena of embryology, regeneration, and adaptation—